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DADULLA I
BIoGRAPHY
Sonia Sotomayor was born in the Bronx, New York City on June 25, 1954 to Puerto
Rican immigrants, Juan Sotomayor and Celina Baez. I Celina worked as a nurse, while Juan was
a factory worker.2 The family lived in the city-owned housing projects, the Bronxdale Houses.
Sotomayor was diagnosed with tlpe-one diabetes when she was eight years old.3 She began
taking daily insulin injections.4 One year later, when she was only nine years old, her father
passed away from a heart attack.s Her mother worked six days a week to support the family and
to send the children to a private Catholic school.6 Sotomayor's mother valued education.T
Sotomayor learned to speak Engtish fluently.8 She attended Cardinal Spellman High School and
gmduated as class valedictorian in 1972.e Sotomayor eamed a frrll scholarship to Princeton
University. She served as co-chairman of the Puerto Rican activist group and lvrote her senior
thesis on the life of Puerto Rican Munoz Marin and his support for Puerto Rican rights.
Sotomayor graduated from Princeton, summa cum laude, in 1976.10 After graduating from
Princeton, Sotomayor married her high school boyfriend, Kevin Edward Noonan.l I She eamed a
scholarship to Yale Law School, where she served as co-chair of the Latin American and Native
American Students Association and was an editor for the Yale Law Joumal.l2 Sotomayor
graduated from Yale Law School in 1979 and was admitted to the New York Bar in 1980.']3
1 
"Who ls Sonia Sotomayor?" CNN. 26 May 2009. Web. 2015.
2lbid.
3 tbid.
4lbid.
s 
"Background on Judge Sonia Sotomayot." The White House. The White House, 29 May 2009. Web. 2015.
6lbid.
7 
"sonia Sotomayor ." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. Dec 2, 20L5.
8lbid.
e tbid.
10 lbid.
11 
"Sonia Sotomayor Biography." Bio.com. A&E Networks Television. Web.
17 lbid.
13 lbid.
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PRoFESSIoNAL CAREER
After graduating from Yale Law School, Sotomayor was hired by Manhattan district
attomey, Robert Morgenthau, to work as an assistant district attomey in New York City.la
Sotomayor began in the trial unit, where she assisted in one of her most memorable cases, "The
Tarzan Murderer."ls This case involved a burglar name Richard Maddicks. Maddicks would
swing into apartment windows from rooftops to enter apartments and shoot and rob victims.
Maddicks is currently serving 137 years to life.r6 In 1984, Sotomayor joined the commercial
litigation practice group, Pavoa & Harcourt in Manhattan.lT The firm focused on business and
corporate law. Sotomayor made partner in 1988.18
U.S DrsrRrcr CouRr
In 1991, Sotomayor was nominated, on the recommendation of Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, by President George H.W. Bush to a judgeship on the United States District Court for
the Southem District ofNew York.Ie She was confirmed by the United States Senate on August
11, 1992. Sotomayor was the first Hispanic federal judge in New York and the youngest judge
in the Southem District at the age of 40.20
It was during her time on the District Court bench that Judge Sotomayor gained fame
when she "saved" baseball by ending a baseball strike.2r In S/ve rman v. Major League Baseball
la 
"Sonia Sotomayo r." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. Dec 2, 2015.
rs lbid.
\6 lbid.
17 
"Sonia Sotomayor Biography." Bio.com. A&F Netwo rks Television. web.
'a lbid.
te lbid.
20 lbid.
21 Lewis, Neil. "On a Supreme Court Prospect's R6sum6: 'Baseball Savior'." The New York Times, 14 May 2009.
Web.
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Player Relations Comm., Lnc.,,22 the owners of major league baseball teams approved a revenue-
sharing plan that implemented a player's salary cap.23 The owners and players negotiated
through June of 1994 when the owners unilaterally decided to withhold $7.8 million that they
were required to pay pursuant to the original agreement.2r On August 12, 1994, the players
went on strike, which lasted until 1995, eliminating the 1994 World Series.25 The National
Labor Relations Board filed an unfiir labor practices complaint when the owners attempted to
use replacement players while implementing a new collective bargaining agreement.26 On
March 3 1 , 1994, Judge Sotomayor issued a preliminary injunction against the owners that
ordered them to restore free agency and arbitration.2T Consequently, the players retumed and
the strike was over.
Uxrrn Staros CoURT oF AppEALs FoR THE SECoND CrRcurr
Justice Sotomayor was nominated by President Bill Clinton to a seat on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 25, 1997.28 On October 2, 1998, Sotomayor was
confirmed by a 67 '29 vote in the Senate.2e The delay may have been due to speculation in the
media that President Clinton was nominating her into the Court of Appeals in order to appoint
her to the United States Supreme Court when there was an opening.3o This would have given
President Clinton the honor of appointing the first Hispanic judge to the Supreme Court.3l This
22 
,'tlvermon v. Mojor Leogue Boseball Ployer Relotions committee, lnc., 67 F.3d 1054,1056 (c.A.2 (N.Y.),1995)
2. td . at to57 .
24 ld.
2e ld.
'?6 td. at 1056.
17 ld.
28 
"Background on Judge Sonia Sotomayot." The White House. The White House, 29 May 2009. Web. 2015
2s tbid.
30 lbid.
3t tbid.
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speculation may have led to attempts by Republicans to block the confirmation.32 Sotomayor
served on the Second Circuit Court olAppeals for ten years. 33 She heard more than 3,000 cases
and authored about 380 majority opinion.3a A study ofher opinions showed that she tended to be
conservative in criminal cases and more liberal in cases conceming civil rights issues.35
Five of Sotomayor's decisions were reviewed by the Supreme Court ofthe United States
and three were overtumed. ln Ricci v. DeStefano,36 Sotomayor, sitting on a panel of tkee
judges, upheld a rejection ofa lawsuit by white firefighters, and one Hispanic firefighter, against
the city of New Haven.37 The firefighters were denied promotions after a promotion
examination yielded no black candidates.3s The city withdrew the test and the results due to
concems that the test itself had a disparate impact against minority test-takers.3e Eighteen
firefighters, who passed the test, brought suit against the city claiming that they were denied
promotions because of their race. a0 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor
of the city of New Haven and rejected the lawsuit.ar One month prior to Justice Sotomayor's
confirmation hearings, the Supreme Court of the United Stated granted Ricci certiorari.a2 The
Supreme Court overtumed the Second Circuit's ruling in a 54 decision, concluding that the
cancellation ofthe promotions ofthe firefighters who passed the examination violated the Equal
32 
"Sonia sotomayot." oyez. chicago-Kent college of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. oec 2,2015.
33 tbid.
34 tbid.
35 lbid.
36 Ricciv. Destefono, 530 F.3d 88, 90 (C.A.2 (Conn.),2008).
37 ld.
38 ld.
'e ld.$ td.
4' ld. at93.
42 Ricci v. Destefono,],29 s.Ct.2658,268r,557 U.S. 557, 593 (U.S.,2009).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.a3
Judge Sotomayor made another ruling that affected professional sports, this time
regarding the National Football League. In Clarett v. Nat'l Football Leagueaa, the National
Football League appealed a summary judgment ganted by the United States District Court for
the Southem District of New York.as The district court concluded that the National Football
League's eligibility rules violated antitrust laws.a5 The rules require that a player wait at least
three full football seasons after high school graduation before entering the National Football
League draft.a7 Judge Sotomayor ruled that federal law precluded the application of antitrust
laws to the National Football League's eligibility rules.a8 The district court's judgrnent was
reversed and the case was remanded.49
THE SUPREME CoURT oF THE UNITED STATES
In 2009, President Barrack Obama nominated Sotomayor to serve on the Supreme Court
of the United States, filling in the vacant seat left by of Justice Souter.so On May 26,2009,
Justice Sotomayor was confirmed by the Senate on a 68-31 vote.5r Justice Sotomayor was the
first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice and third female justice after Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.52 Justice Sotomayor is serving her sixth year on the Supreme
4' Ricci v. Destefono, L29 s.ct.2658, 2681, 557 U.s. 557, 593 (U.S.,2009).
4 clorettv. Not'l Footboll Ledque,369 F.3d 124,725l2d Cn.2004l,.
4s ld.
46 td. at 1,29.
o7 ld. at ].32,
43 ld.
4e ld. al'J,45.
s 
"sonia sotomayot." oyez. chicago-Kent College of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. Dec2,2ol5.
5t tbid.
s2 
"Sonia Sotomayor Biography." Bio.com. A&E Networks Television. web.
Court. During her years on the bench, Sotomayor has established
liberal judges on the bench.
The following will analyze ten of Justice Sotomayor's
opinions, four majority opinions, and three concurring opinions.
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herself as one of the more
opinions: three dissenting
FIRST CASE HEARD
CtrrzrNs Uxtrro v. FEDEML ELEcrroN CoMMrssroN
Justice Sonia Sotomayor's first case heard on the United States Supreme Court was
Citizens [Jnited v. Federal Election Commission.53 Although Sotomayor did not author an
opinion in this case, this case is notable in that it is the first case she heard while sitting on the
United States Supreme Court. During the second round of oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor sat
on the bench for the first time.5a This case dealt with campaign financing and the First
Amendment rights of corporations.55 The Court held that corporations have the same political
speech rights as individuals under the First Amendment and could not be prohibited from making
independent expenditures in political campaigns.56 The Court found no compelling govemment
interest for preventing corporations from making independent expenditures.sT In Citizens
United, the nonprofit organization, Citizens United, used its funds to create a documentary on
Hilary Clinton.s8 The documentary, titled "Hilary," featured commentary urging voters not to
vote for Hilary Clinton.se Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ('BCRA)
prohibited independent expenditures by corporations or unions to fund "electioneering
s3 Citizens lJnited v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.5. 310, 311, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882, 775 L. Ed.2d 753 (201,0).
sa 
"Sonia Sotomayor." Oyez. Chicago-Kent College of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. Dec 2, 2015.
55 Citizens United v. Federcl Election Com h, 130 S.Ct. 876, 881 (U.5.,2010)
s6 ld.
57 td. a1887.
58 ld.
5e td. at 892.
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communications'.6o The Supreme Court overtumed the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia's ruling that Citizens United was prohibited from advertising the film
"Hilary" under Section 203 of BCRA.6I The Supreme Court struck down the sections of the
BCRA that prohibited corporations from making independent expenditures finding that the
prohibition violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech.62 Justice Sotomayor
dissented from the majority. The dissent argued that the First Amendment rights were never
intended, by the framers, to apply to corporations.63
DISSENTING OPINIoNS
ScHUETTE v. Coet ro DrrsNo AFFTRMATTw AcrroN, INTEcRATToN & IMMToRANT Rrcrrrs &
FIGET FoR EQUAL ByANy MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN)
ln Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Afirmative Action6a, Michigan voters approved an
amendment to the state's constitution to prohibit "all sex- and race-based preferences in public
education, public employment, and public contracting."65 Consequently, a group of
organizations and individuals brought suit against Michigan state officials.66 The group claimed
that the amendment to the state constitution was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 67
Bill Shuette, the attomey general of Michigan, was listed as the defendant.
@ rd. at 895.
6'ld.
62 td. at 928.
63 td. at 929.
Schuette v. Coolition to Defend Affirmotive Action, lntegrotion ond lmmigront Rights ond Fight Ior Equolity 8y
Any Meons Necessory (BAMN),134 S.Ct. 1623 (U.5.,2014).
6s td. at L628.
56 ld. al L623.
61 td. at L626.
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The U.S District Court for the District of Eastem Michigan granted surnmary judgment in
favor of the defendants.6s The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
lower court's decision, holding that the amendment was unconstitutional because of the unfair
burden placed on persons who seek to have race considered as one of the numerous factors for
admissions in universities.6e
The question presented in Schuetle is whether an amendment to a state's constitution to
prohibit race- and sex-based preferential treatment and discrimination in public university
admission decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.To In a
6-2 decision, with Justice Elena Kagan recused, a plurality reversed the Sixth Circuit's
judgment.Tr In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the plurality held that the case
ff tumed on whether the voters of a state can choose ro prohibit the use of racial reference in/-?
the\ decisions of govemmental bodies and not about the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions.T2 The plurality goes on to say that it is not the court's role to disempower the voters'
right to make certain choices stating that, "[t]here is no authority in the Constitution of the
United States or in this Court's precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that
commit this policy determination to the voters."73
Justice Sotomayor wrote a powerfully worded 58-page dissent, which was joined by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 7a Justice Sotomayor argues that the amendment to Michigan's
state constitution places a burden on minority groups in violation of the the Equal Protection
n EAMN v. Regents ol univ. of Mich.,539 t.Supp.zd 924.
6e Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, lntegration and lmmigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By
Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1630 (U.S.,2014).
10 ld.
71 ld.
72 ld. at L624.
1' ld. at 7638.
1o ld. at 76s1.
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Clause.Ts Justice Sotomayor also refers to the Court's precedent of striking down laws that
promoted the unequal treatment of minorities.T6 Justice Sotomayor states that:
"The effect of $26 is that a white gmduate of a public Michigan
university who wishes to pass his historical privilege on to his
children may freely lobby the board of that university in favor of
an expanded legacy admissions policy, whereas a black
Michagander who was denied the opportunity to attend that very
university cannot lobby the board in favor of a policy that might
give his children a chance that he never had and that they might
never have absent that policy."77
As a Bronx native bom to immigrant parents and one ofthe two Justices of color on the
Supreme Cou( bench, I believe Justice Sotomayor's own personal life experiences influenced
her strong dissent in Schuette. Affirmative action programs in universities allow individuals of
diverse and minority backgrounds to have an equal opportunity for admission. From Justice
Sotomayor's dissenting opinion, it is evident that she is a firm believer in and supporter of
affirmative action programs. Justice Sotomayor states that, "this Court has recognized that
diversity in education is paramount. With good reason. Diversity ensures that the next generation
moves beyond the stereotypes, the assumptions, and the superficial perceptions that students
coming from less-heterogeneous communities may harbor, consciously or not, about people who
do not look like them."78
ls ld . at 7652.
76 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, lntegration and lmmigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By
Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1653 (U.s.,2014).
11 ld. at 1662.
1a ld. at 1682.
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Cntue e n or ComutncE oF U-S v. WHITING
ln Chamber of Commerce v. Witing,Te the Supreme Court of the United States upheld an
Arizona state law that allowed for the revocation of business licenses of state companies that
knowingly hired undocumented workers.80 In this case, the Arizona state legislature passed the
Legal Arizona Workers Act ("LAWA"), which provided for the suspension or revocation of the
business licenses of state employers who knowingly or intentionally employ "unauthorized
aliens."8l Various businesses and organizations, including Chamber of Commerce, challenged
the enforceability of the statute claiming that Arizona violated the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution by passing its own immigration enforcement statute.t2 Specifically, the law was
preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"1.83 The district
court upheld the law.& The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.s5 The Ninth Circuit held that the IRCA excepts "state licensing and
similar laws" from preemptive reach thus LAWA was not preempted.86 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted Certiorari to review.
The issue in the case is whether a state law that provided the revocation of business
licenses of state companies that hired undocumented workers was preempted by the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.87 The Chamber of Commerce argued that the
legislative history made it clear that Congress intended the licensing exception to allow states to
revoke licenses of those actors who violated immigration laws and that this determination was to
7e Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (201L).
& td. at 7970.
a\ ld.
82 ld.
81 ld. at 1971,.
s ld. at t97i.
8s ld.
86 ld.
'1 ld. at ]^978.
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be made by federal officials not state offrcials.88 In a 5-3 decision, with Justice Kagan recusing,
the majority affirmed the lower court's decision.8e In an opinion written by Chief Justice John
Roberts, the majority stated that "Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of the
authority Congtess chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted."eo
Justice Robert opines that, "authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative
tustory. "
Justice Sotomayor authored a dissent in which she states "in isolation, the text of IRCA's
saving clause provides no hint as to which tlpe or types of licensing laws Congress had in
mind."e2 She argues that the licensing exception of the IRCA is "hardly a paragon of textual
clarity" and the Cou( should look to Congressional intent.e3 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor
claims that the majority's holding is inconsistent with the "comprehensive scheme" of the
IRCA.e4 Justice Sotomayor reads the licensing exception to permit States to "impose licensing
sanctions following a final federal determination that a person has violated $132aa(a)(1)(A) by
knowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring for a fee an unauthorized alien."es Under Justice
Sotomayor's construction of the licensing exception, LAWA "cannot escape pre-emption"
because the LAWA's "sanctions are not premised on a final federal determination that an
employer has violated IRCA.'46
* td.
8e ld. at 1987 .
eo Chamber of Commerce of U.5. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 131 S. Ct. 1970, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (2011).
e1 td. at 1980.
s1 td. at tggg.
e3 ld.
e4 ld.
e5 ld. at 2004.
e6 td. at 2oos.
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I believe that Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Chamber of Commerce o/ {lS showcases
her empathy towards undocumented immigrants. Having been bom to two immigrant parents, it
is no surprise that Justice Sotomayor's opinions are consistent with defending the rights of
immigmnts and the protection of minority groups against oppression.
Sct,tttsgtt v. CUELLAR DE OsoRIo
lrt Scialabbo v. Ceullar de Osorio, the respondents are lawful permanent residents in the
United States.eT The respondents applied for family-sponsored visas for their children but due to
visa quotas and backlogs in the United States immigration system, the children had "aged out" of
eligibility for derivative child-visas.et The children had tumed twenty-one before the visas were
ganted and consequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals converted their child-applications
to adullapplications.s The respondents brought suits in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California requesting that the Court order the Board of Immigration Appeals
to use the children's original filing date.roo The respondents argued that the Child Status
Protection Act grants remedy to all minors who have "aged out" ofthe sponsoring petition by the
time the visa becor@vailable.ror The district court denied their request holding that the
relevant provision in the Child Status Protection Act only applies to children with an independent
relationship with the original petitioning lawfi-rl permanent resident.lo2 In this case, the mother
was the principal beneficiary of the visa petition and the child piggyback of the mother as a
e7 Sciolobbo v. Cuetlor de Osorio,134 S.Ct. 2191, 2197 (U.5.,2014)
e8 td. at 2794.
se td. at 2194.
\N ld. at 2793.
nl ld.
to1 ld.
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derivative beneficiary.ro3 The respondents appealed to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.lM The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.ros The
United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari.
ln a 5-4 decision, Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act as providing a remedy to
"age-out" non-citizens who qualified or could have qualified as principal beneficiaries of a visa
petition, rather tlan a derivative beneficiary piggy-backing on a parent, is a permissible
construction of the statute.l06 The majority accorded Chevron deference to the Board of
Immigration Appeals interpretation of the statute. 107
Justice Sotomayor authored a dissent in which Justice Breyer joined and Justice Thomas
joined in part. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor does not find that the Board of Immigration
Appeals' interpretation permissible.
"In reaching this conclusion, the Court fails to follow a cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation: When deciding whether Congress has
"specifically addressed the question at issue," thereby leaving no room for
an agency to fill a statutory gap, courts must "interpret the statute 'as a ...
coherent regulatory scheme' and 'fit, if possible, all parts into [a]
harmonious whole.' " FDA v. Brown & ll'illiamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 132 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (citation
omitted). Because the Court and the BIA ignore obvious ways in which d
1153(hX3) can operate as a coherent whole and instead construe the
103 ld.
lv Sciolobba v. Cuellor de Osorio,134 S.Ct. 2191, 2202iJ.5.,201,4]}.
ros ld.
ros ld. at2197.
N7 td. at2195-
DADULLA I4
statute as a self-contradiction that was broken from the moment Congress
wrote it, I respectfully dissent."l08
Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion il Scialabba is anotler example ofher affinity to
immigrant individuals. Her decisions are aligned with the protection of immigrant rights.
MAJoRTTY OPrNroNs
MoHAwK INDasrRrES, INc. v. CARPENTER
Justice Sotomayor wrote her first majority opinion in Mohawk Indus., lnc. y.
Carpenter.tqe h Mohqwk Indus., Inc., al employee made a complaint to the company's human
resources department claiming that the company was employing "undocumented immigrants.-ll0
The employee was directed to meet with a comprmy lawyer.lll During the meeting, the lawyer
allegedly pressured the employee to recant his statements.ll2 The employee was fired and
claimed that it was because he failed to recant his statements.rrl The employee brought claims
against the company and during litigation requested information from the company regarding the
meeting with the lawyer.lla The company claimed that the information was protected under
attomey-client privilege.r15 The District Court for the Northem District of Georgia granted the
employee's motion to compel the company to produce the information and the company sought
an interlocutory appeal.rl6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
lM ld. at 22ti .
!@ Mohowk lndustries, tnc. v. Corpenter,sS8 U.S. 1oo, 1oo (2009).
uo /d. at 103.
111 d. at i.oo.
117 ld.
i1 ld. at 1.o4.
114 ld.
rls ld.
tt6 ld.
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dismissed the appeal and denied a writ.rlT The Supreme Court of the United States $anted
certiorari.
The question presented in Mohawk Indus., Inc., was whether disclosure orders adverse to
the attorney-client privilege qualifu for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.rlE
Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion, joined by the other eight justices, held that privilege-
related disclosure orders does not qualifu for immediate appeal under the collateral order
doctrine.lle The Court reasoned that including privilege-related disclosure orders under
collateral orders would burden the Courts of Appeals because it would delay the resolution of
cases.l20 Additionally, the majority reasoned that appeals occurring post judgrnent are sufficient
to protect the rights of litigants.l2l
Throughout the opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor used the term "undocumented
immigrant" instead of "illegal immigrant." It was the first time the term appeared in a Supreme
Court opinion.l22 From her very authored opinion, one can see the respect she has for immigranttvA/_\/C.-/L---,
persons.
J.D.B. v. NoRrH C.enouN.t
ln J.D.B., a 13 year-old seventh grade special education student was interrogated by a
uniformed police officer.l23 J.D.B. was escorted from his social studies classroom to a
conference room where he was interviewed by a police officer, Assistant Principal, and an
117 /d. at 105.
118 /d. at 106.
lle Mohowk lndustries, lnc. v. Corpenter,558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009).
,2o ld.
r21 ld.
122 
"sonia Sotomayot." oyez. chicago-Kent College of Law at lllinois Tech, n.d. Dec 2, 2015.
123 l.D.B. v. N. Cotolina,1315. Ct. 2394, 2397,18OL. Ed.2d 310 (U.s.2011).
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administrator behind closed doors.r24 The school or authorities did not inform J.D.B.'s
grandmother prior to the interview.l25 J.D.B. was not read his Miranda rights at this time.l26 The
police officer questioned J.D.B. for about thirty to forty minutes regarding recent neighborhood
break-ins.r27 A digital camera matching the description of one that had gone missing during the
.>
break-ins earlier that week was found inJ.D.B.'s- school and seen in possession.l28 J.D.B.
initially denied any involvement claiming that he was in that neighborhood trying to earn some
money by mowing lawns.l2e The Assistant Principal pressured J.D.B to "do the right thing"
because the truth always comes out.l30 The police officer wamed J.D.B. that there was a
possibility he could face juvenile detention which led to J.D.B.'s confession.r3r J.D.B. was
subsequently given his Miranda rights. 132
J.D.B. was charged with larceny and breaking and entering.l33 During the trial, J.D.B.
moved to suppress his confession and any evidence obtained as a result of the confession.l3a
J.D.B. argued that he was in custody during the interrogation and that the police officer had
failed to read him his Miranda rights.rss The state trial court denied the motion to suppress the
confession and evidence finding that J.D.B. was not in police custody at the time of the
interrogation.r36 The North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court
124 ld. at 2399.
rE ld.
126 M.
r27 ld.
r28 ld,
De J.D.B. v. N. Cotolino, Tg:-S. Ct.2394,2399,180 t. Ed. 2d 310 (U.S. 2011).
rN td. al2400.
rtr ld.
L2 ld.
133 d.
lY ld.
r15 J.D.B. v. N. Corolino, T3lS. Ct.2394,24oo, r80 L. Ed. 2d 310 (u.s.2011).
136 td- at zfio]..
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affirmed the state trial court's decision.r3T The North Carolina Supreme Court slated that age
should not be taken into consideration when determining whether or not an individual is in
custody for Miranda purposes.l38 The Supreme Court of the United States granted Certiorari.
The issue in this case is "whether the Miranda custody analysis includes considerations
of a juvenile suspect's age."r3e In a 5-4 decision, Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the
majority.rao The Cou( held that age is relevant in the Miranda custody analysis for juveniles.
Justice Sotomayor states tlat, "[i]t is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit
to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing
no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that corrmonsense reality, we hold
that a child's age properly informs the Miranda cuslody analysis."rar The majority reasoned that
failing to incorporate age into custody analysis would "blind" themselves to reality and that
judges and police officers are competent enough to evaluate the effect of age.la2 The case was
reversed. The decision in J.D.B., allows courts to factor in age when conducting a Miranda
custody analysis.
MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
Michigan v. Bryant is a case involving the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation. la3
kt Bryant, the police responded to a gas station after a report ofa shooting.ra The police found
Anthony Covington suffering from a gunshot wound to his abdomen.ras Covington told the
r3t ld.
t38 ld.
r]e ld. at 2408.
t40 ld.
!4t J.D.B. v. N. Corolino, T3L S. Ct. 2394,2408,180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (u.S. 2011).
142 ld,
143 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 3M,344,131 S. ct. 1143, 7747, 179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011.).
14 ld,
1as People v. Bryant, 483 Mich. 132, 135-36, 768 N.w.2d 65, 67 (2009).
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police that the defendant, Richard "Rick" Bryant, had shot Covinglon through the door while
Covinglon was on defendant's back porch.la6 Covington described the defendant's physical
appearance and disclosed the location of the defendant's home.laT Covinglon was transported to
the hospital but died a few hours later.ra8 At trial, Covinglon's statements were admitted into
evidence under tlte excited utterance hearsay exception.l4e Bryant was found guilty of second-
degree murder.l5o On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that the statements were testimonial and did not fall within the emergency exception in
Dovis v. ll/as hington.t 5 |
The question presenled in Bryant is whether inquiries of victims conceming a perpetrator
are non-testimonial if they objectively indicate that the purpose ofthe interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.rs2 lt a 6-2 decision, with Justice Kagan
recusing, the majority reversed and remanded the lower court decision.ls3 Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, authored the majority opinion, holding
that the description of the p€rpetrator and the location of the shooting were "not testimonial
statements because they had a "primary purpose ... to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency."lsa Justice Sotomayor uses the primary purpose test which differentiates
between statements made to the police because ofan ongoing emergency verses statements made
to gather facts for prosecution.l55
1$ ld.
147 ld.
14 td.
,4s ld.
ln ld. at 736.
t5r People v. Bryont, 483 Mich.132, 136, 768 N.w.2d 65,67 l29o9l.
's2 Michigon v. Bryont, 562 u.s.344, 344, 131 S. ct. 7143, 1747,179 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2011).
r53 td. a|378.
'Y ld. at 351.
,ss ld.
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I believe that Justice Sotomayor's years as a prosecutor might have influenced her
decisions in this case and other cases dealing with criminal procedure. This decision is favorable
to prosecutors in that it essentially bypasses the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause by
.f rP(/ allowing prosecutorspse a deceased person's statements. It provides another exception to
hearsay that benefits the prosecution by allowing statements, which would otherwise be
inadmissible, into evidence if a court finds that the primary purpose of the statements were made
to the police because ofan ongoing emergency.
conviction under a statute that criminalizes conduct described by both $841's felony provision
and its misdemeanor provision, such as a statute that punishes all marijuana distribution without
regard to the amount or remuneration, is a conviction for an offense that "proscribes conduct
punishable as a felony under' the CSA.-I57
Petitioner, Adrian Moncrieffe, a Jamaican citizen, was stopped in 2007 .t5t During the
traIfic stop, police found 1.3 grams of marijuana in Petitioner's car.r5e Petitioner pled guilty to
possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute, a violation of Ga. Code. Ann. $ 16-13-
306X1) (2004.t60 Pursuant to $ 42-8-60(a) (1997), a state statute that authorizes more lenient
treatment to first-time offenders, the Georgia state trial court refrained from imposing a
156 133 s. ct. t67B l2ol2l.
r51 Mon ietfe,l33 S. Ct. at 1684.
158 ld. at 1683.
15s ld.
r@ ld.
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Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion in Moncriffi v. Holder.ts6 The opinion 
NrN 
"
sought to resolve a conflict among the federal Courts of Appeals "with respect to whether a I
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conviction.l6l Instead, the trial court permitted Petitioner to complete five years of probation,
after which the charge will be expunged.162
The Federal Govemment sought to deport Petitioner, claiming that the Georgia
conviction constituted an aggravated felony since possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, under the Controlled Substances Act, 2l U.S.C. $ 8a1(a), was punishable by up to five
years'imprisonment.l6s An immigration judge agreed and ordered Petitioner's deportation. Id.
The Board of Immigration Appeals alfirmed on appeal, and the Court of Appeals denied
Petitioner's petition for review.re The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the CSA's felony 
./
provision takes precedent over ruly misdemeanor provision in a federal criminal prosecution, tn" 
.fi
state offense against petitioner was "equivarent to a federar felony."r65 
,Nl/ Y*
CoNCURRTNG OPrNroNs
UN|TED STATES v. foNEs
In United States v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that the attachment ofa
Global Positioning System ('GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and the use of GPS device to
monitor a vehicle's movements is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 16
ln Jones, the defendant, Antoine Jones, owned and operated a nightclub that came under
investigation for narcotics trafficking.l67 The police obtained a warrant authorizing the use ofa
GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle but installed the GPS after the expiration of the
16, ld.
16' ld. at L691.
1a ld.
14 ld.
16s ld. at 1683-84 (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, 392 (5th cir. 2011)); 21 U.s.c. E 841(bX1XD)).
Lffi United Stotes v. lones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 946, 181 L Ed. 2d 911 (2012).
,67 ld.
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wqrraqt.l68 The police monitored Jones' Jeep for twenty-eight days.l6e Jones was arrested and
acquitted on all the charges except the conspiracy charge, which was subsequently retried.lT0 In
January 2008, Jones was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to
distribute five or more kiloglams ofcocaine and fifty or more grams ofcocaine base.lTl
During the trial, defense counsel filed motions to suppress the data obtained through the
GPS.I72 On appeal, Jones argued that the conviction should be overtumed because his Fourth
'QYYA)-
Amendment rights-violated.l73 Specifically, Jones contended that the use of the GPS tracker,
-t,
without a valid warrant, was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.lT4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction,
holding that the use of the GPS tracking device was a search and violated Jones's "reasonable
expectation of pri vacy."t1s The Supreme Court of the United States granted Certiorari.
The question presented in this case is whether the warrantless use ofa tracking device on
Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated Jones' Fourth Amendment
rights.rT6 In a 9-0 decision, the Court found that this was a violation of the Jones' Fourth
Amendment.lTT Although the decision was unanimous, the Court was divided in the analysis.lT8
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority concluding that the installation of the
ta M.
r6e ld.
r7o United States v. Moynord,615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2O1O) affd in part sub nom. Urited
Stotes v. lones,132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed.2d977 (2072],.
rr1 ld.
111 ld.
173 United States v. Moynord, 675 F.3d 544l21tol.
t14 ld.
r1s ld-
176 U.S. v. Jones,132 5. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).
177 U.S. v..lones,132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
r18 ld-
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GPS onto the vehicle, which the Court considered to be an "effect" was a trespass of Jones'
personal effects to obtain information.lTe
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing the need to apply the Katz
test to GPS monitoring that does not involve a trespassory installation.l8o Justice Sotomayor
goes beyond trespass and states that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the
govemment violates a subjective expectation ofprivacy that society recognizes as reasonable,lsl
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito's concurrence that long term monitoring in
investigations of offenses impinges on expectations of privacy, but argues t}rat even short-term
monitoring may be subject to constitutional scrutiny because of "some unique attributes ofGPS
surveillance."l82
Mrc rcAN v. BAv MrLLs INDIAN CoLtuuxtrv
ln Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,ts3 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that tribal sovereign immunity prevented a state from suing a tribe in federal court in a case
where tribal activity violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act outside of Indian lands.re In
Bay Milk Indian Communify, Michigan and the Bay Mills Indian Community entered a compact
that allowed the tribe to open a casino in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.l8s The Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act allows an Indian tribe to operate a casino on Indian Lands.l86 Bay Mills
opened a second casino in Vanderbilt, Michigan on lands purchased with eamings from the
1D td. at 949.
'N U.S. v. Jones,132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
181 ld. at 955.
'82 U.S. v. Jones, L32 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012).
t8' Michigon v. Boy Mills lndion Community,134S. Ct.2024,2O2S l2}74l.
t84 td.
r85 ld. at 2029.
186 ld.
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congressionally established land trust.r87 The State of Michigan sued the tribe claiming that Bay
Mills violated the Tribal-State compact and sought an injunction to enjoin the gaming activity
under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.r88 The District Court granted the injunction.l8e The
United States Supreme Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision holding that
tribal sovereignty immunity barred the suit and that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act only
authorized suits to "enjoin gaming activity located 'on Indian land,'whereas Michigan's
complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory."rq
The issue here is whether a federal court has jurisdiction over tribal activity that violates
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, but takes place outside of Indian Lands.lel The question
before the Court is whether tribal sovereign immunity prevents the state from suing in federal
court. In a 5-4 decision, the majority opinion, written by Justice Kagan, held that Indian tribes
have sovereign immunity that is only revocable by Congressional action.le2
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion stating that, "[p]rinciples of comity strcngly
counsel in favor of continued recognition of tribal sovereign immunity, including for off-
reservation commercial conduct."l93
"For two reasons, these goals are best served by recognizing
sovereign immunity for Indian Tribes, including immunity for off-
reservation conduct, except where Congress has expressly
abrogated it. First, a legal rule that permitted States to sue Tribes,
absent their consent, for commercial conduct would be anomalous
in light of the existing prohibitions against Tribes' suing States in
r87 ld. at 2027 .
'* ld.
tge Michigon v. Boy Mills lndion Community, L34 S. Cl.. 2024, 2029 l2'14l.\* ld. at 2026.
lel Michigon v. Boy Mills lndion Community,lS4 s. Cl.2024,2042 (201,41.
re2 ld. at 2039.
1e3 td. at 2039.
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like circumstances. Such disparate treatment of these two classes
of domestic sovereigns would hardly signal the Federal
Government's respect for tribal sovereignty. Second, Tribes face a
number of barriers to raising revenue in traditional ways. If Tribes
are ever to become more self-sufficient, and fund a more
substantial portion of their own governmental functions,
commercial enterprises will likely be a central means of achieving
that goal." lea
Throughout her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor outlines the history and
importance of respect for tribal sovereignty.le5 Her concurrence in Bay Mills Indian Community
is a testament the respect Justice Sotomayor accords to minority groups.
ALLEYNE y. UNITED STATES
ln Alleyne v. United States, the United States Supreme Court decided that all ofthe facts
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submittedelltg$fjysury.re6 In
Alleyne, the robber of a convenience store, Allen Alleyne, was indicted for robbery and
possessing a firearm.leT A jury convicted Alleyne on both counts.le8 The mandatory minimum
sentence was five years' imprisonment but would rise to seven years if the defendant was found
to have "brandished" the firearm during the crime.rry During the trial, the judge found that
Alleyne probably brandished the firearm, not the jury.200 Alleyne objected to the
recommendation of a seven year minimum sentence claiming that the judge's finding of the
rY ld.
'es ld. at 2o4s.
1e6 Alleyne v. u.5., 133 s.ct. 2151, 2163 (u.S., 2013).
1e7 Alleyne v. u.S., 133 S. Ct. 2151 ,2152 (20731.
re8 b.
1es ld.
2@ A eyne v. U.s., 133 s. Ct. 2151,215j (2013).
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brandishing of the firearm violated Alleyne's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.2or Alleyne
was sentenced to 130 months' imprisonment.2o2 The United States District Court for the Eastem
District of Virginia ovemrled the objection.2o3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affrrmed.2H
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court ovemrled Hanis v. United States,20s
which held that judicial fact-finding that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime
is permissible under the Sixth Amendment.206 The majority held that an element of a crime, if
that element increases the mandatory minimum punishment, must be submitted to the jury and
found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.207 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
lower court's decision.
Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion that firther discusses the ovemrling of
Harris and stare decisis.z0| Justice Sotomayor emphasizes the importance of stare decisis but
also the appropriateness of overturning decisions inconsistent with the shifting of
jurisprudence.2@
REvIEw
AreviewofJusticeSotomayor'sopinionsshowshercompassionandempathyfor
minoritygroupsandimmigants.Beingaminorityherself,aswellasthefirstHispanicJusticeto
sit on the united States Supreme court, it .o...X no surprise that she has become a defender/\
6-b
2o1 ld,
102 ld. al2l56-
20. ld.
x'oror* u.u.s., 536 U.5. 545 (2 W2\ overru*d bv-Allevne v' u's'' 
133 S' Ct' 21s1 (2013)'
*i ait"ui" u. u.s.,133 S ct 21s1' 2163-64 (2013)
*i li1rlrn, u. u.s.., 133 s' ct 2151' 2155 (2013)'
:2of-' u11"rns r.u's', 133 s' ct' 2151' 2155 
(2013)
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against minority oppression and a protector of immigrant rights. In cases involving criminal
procedure, it seems that Justice Sotomayor is more inclined to rule more favorable to the
prosecution's side. This may be due to the fact that Justice Sotomayor spent her early
professional years as an assistant district attomey. Overall, I believe that Justice Sotomayor's
opinion have been clear, well-worded, and true to her ideologies.
